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Abstract
Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently con-
cerned with a trade-o⁄ between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high
valuations. In our experimental study, we ￿nd that it is not pro￿table to exclude the most
able contestant in favor of greater homogeneity among the remaining contestants, even if the
theoretical exclusion principle predicts otherwise. This is because the strongest contestants con-
siderably overexert. A possible explanation is that these contestants are afraid they will regret
a low but risky bid if they lose and thus prefer a strategy which gives them a low but secure
pay-o⁄.
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11 Introduction
There are many sports with dominant athletes, such as Roger Federer in the Tennis ATP Tour or
Tiger Woods in the Golf PGA Tour, which attract a lot of attention and cause the ￿ superstars￿
to serve as a leading force for their sports. However, too great a dominance by one participant
might also lead to boredom and a lower niveau of the competition. For example, due to Michael
Schumacher￿ s dominance in the Formula One races, the viewing ￿gures dropped and consequently
the FIA changed several of their rules to make the races more tense.1 Likewise, US professional sport
leagues (e.g. the NBA, NFL, NHL or MLB) apply a rookie drafting system that gives homogeneity
among the competing teams a good chance, as the weakest team ￿rst gets the right to pick the
"rookies" out of the pool of the most promising junior players. These examples show the two sides
of the coin the participation of a superior contest participant has.
Contests not only appear in sports but are pervasive in our society (see e.g. Frank (1995)).
Firms install e⁄ort tournaments, lobbyists compete for in￿ uence by donating money to political
parties, and researchers compete for research grants. All these examples have in common that
rewards are allocated based on relative rather than on absolute performance, that the e⁄ort of the
losers is lost and that the contest designer￿ s main focus is the overall performance. Hence, there are
many situations in which the composition of a competing group matters. In this paper, we attempt
to answer the question, whether the presence of one strong contestant or a more homogeneous
contest maximizes the total revenue. To do this, we employ a series of laboratory experiments.
Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993) show in a theoretical contribution that a trade-o⁄
between the inclusion of contestants with high valuations and contest homogeneity exists. They
analyze an all-pay auction in a complete information framework with several bidders who have
potentially di⁄erent valuations.2 With one prize, the presence of a strong contestant might induce
other contestants to reduce their e⁄ort, since their individual probability of winning the contest
is low. This in turn leads the strongest contestant to lower her e⁄ort and possibly, as a result,
to a lower overall performance. For certain heterogenous group compositions it is bene￿cial for
the contest designer to exclude the strongest contestant, thereby creating a more homogeneous
contest among the remaining participants and generating higher expected total e⁄orts. This so-
called exclusion principle implies that selecting the participants can be an important issue in terms
1See BBC (2002).
2As the all-pay auction with complete information is the limiting case of a contest, we will use the terms auction
and contest interchangeably, as well as the expressions bidder and contestant.
2of revenue. Indeed, Brown (2008) provides empirical evidence for lower performance of competitors
in the presence of one dominant contestant. She uses data from the PGA Tour and ￿nds that the
presence of Tiger Woods leads other high-skilled professionals to need more strokes to complete the
course than when Tiger Woods is absent.
In this paper we experimentally test the exclusion principle by Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries
(1993), i.e. we investigate whether exclusion indeed leads to an increase in overall revenue when
the bidders are heterogenous in their valuations. We ￿nd that in our setup excluding the strongest
bidder is never bene￿cial. This ￿nding can be mainly attributed to the behavior of the strongest
contestants as they considerably overexert. The weaker bidders increase their e⁄ort signi￿cantly
when the strongest bidder is excluded, but cannot compensate for the revenue generated by the
strongest bidder.
In fact, the bidders with the respective highest valuation in one group often choose a strategy
guaranteeing them to win the prize, which involves bids higher than the valuation of the second-
strongest bidder. Hence, subjects seem willing to give up quite a substantial portion of their rent
just to avoid losing the auction. Furthermore, the subjects are more likely to choose this "winning-
for-sure" strategy if the rent from playing this strategy is bigger. We explain this kind of behavior
with regret aversion. A regret averse bidder prefers a small but secure pay-o⁄ over a large but
uncertain payo⁄ because she tries to avoid the regret about foregone rents that she would feel if
she chose a risky strategy instead and lost the auction.
There is a large experimental literature on tournaments and auctions either with private
values or common values with homogeneous contestants.3 Two quite robust ￿ndings occur in these
experiments. First, subjects show signi￿cant overexertion in comparison to the Nash equilibrium.4
This is the case in all-pay auctions with incomplete information (e.g. M￿ller and Schotter (2010),
or Noussair and Silver (2006)), as well as in the most simple setting of a common value auction
with symmetric bidders (Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006)). Despite the observed overdissipation
on average, there is typically a dichotomy in bidding behavior on the individual level in all-pay
auctions with incomplete information. Agents with valuations below an individual cut-o⁄ level
(or high costs) drop out in the sense that they exert e⁄orts close to zero, whereas agents with
3There are several experimental studies which test the Tullock rent-seeking contest (e.g. Davis and Reilly (1998);
Millner and Pratt (1989)). The vast majority of these papers ￿nd larger rent-seeking expenditures than predicted by
theory.
4Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1998) show that this overdissipation pattern can be explained by a logit equilibrium
in which agents commit mistakes by choosing bidding strategies that do not give the highest expected payo⁄.
3high valuations (or low costs) exceed the equilibrium e⁄ort level by far (see Barut, Kovenock, and
Noussair (2002); M￿ller and Schotter (2010)). Also in all-pay auctions with identical and commonly
known valuations, bimodal bidding can be observed (Ernst and Th￿ni (2009)). These ￿ndings can
be explained by subjects displaying risk aversion with respect to gains and risk-seeking behavior in
the loss domain, as modeled by prospect theory (Tversky and Kahnemann (1992)).
To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst experiment on all-pay auctions that combines hetero-
geneity and complete information. Hence, the tendency of players to opt for a strategy that
guarantees them winning the prize and a positive rent at the same time has not been observed in
the experimental auction literature so far. In the existing experiments on all-pay auctions with
complete information the bidders were symmetric with respect to their valuations, which rules out
the existence of a strategy guaranteeing a positive payo⁄. In auction experiments with incomplete
information a bidder can never be sure of being the one with the highest valuation (or lowest cost
of e⁄ort).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a short outline of the theory
and introduces the experimental procedures. Section 3 presents the main results and Section 4
discusses these results and concludes.
2 Theoretical Prediction and Experimental Design
2.1 Theoretical prediction
We consider the case of an all-pay auction with complete information as analyzed by Hillman and
Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993) with one prize and up to three bidders.
All participants in the auction value the prize di⁄erently, where a high valuation can alternatively
be interpreted as a contestant having low costs of exerting e⁄ort in the contest. The valuations
vi;i 2 f1;2;3g, are commonly known and heterogeneous in our setup, such that they can be ordered
as v1 > v2 > v3. All participating bidders simultaneously submit their bid. The bidder with the
highest bid wins the auction, receives the prize that she values vi, and pays her bid. All other bidders
lose their bid without gaining anything. Ties are broken randomly. In this case, a unique mixed
strategy equilibrium exists that is described in the following. With one prize, only the two bidders
with the highest valuations actively participate in the auction. The bidder with the third-highest
valuation remains inactive, as his expected value from participating in the contest is negative. The
bidder with the highest valuation in the contest randomizes continuously and uniformly over [0;v2],
4where v2 denotes the second-highest valuation among the bidders participating. The bids of the
bidder with the second-highest valuation v2 are also uniformly distributed, given that he submits
a positive bid. However, he remains inactive, i.e. bids zero, with probability (1 ￿ v2=v1), where
v1 denotes the highest valuation among the participating bidders. Therefore, the strongest bidder
randomizes according to the distribution function G1 (x) = x=v2 and the second-strongest bidder
according to G2 (x) = 1 ￿ v2=v1 + x=v1: Hence, the expected bid of the bidder with the highest
valuation in a round is E[x1] = v2=2 and the expected bid of the bidder with the second-highest
valuation in a round is E[x2] = (v2)
2 =2v1.
In expectation, the strongest bidder in the auction receives a payo⁄ of v1 ￿v2, whereas the
expected payo⁄ of the second-strongest bidder is zero. The expected sum of bids, i.e. the revenue










Thus, in order to maximize the auctioneer￿ s revenue, the contestant with the highest valuation, v1,

















This inequation is ful￿lled if v1 >> v2 ￿ v3, i.e. if v1 is su¢ ciently large compared to the other
valuations. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The presence of a very strong
contestant discourages the others. If there are three bidders with valuations v1 > v2 > v3, only
the two strongest bidders actively participate in the auction. Furthermore, the probability that
the second-strongest bidder submits a strictly positive bid decreases in v1 and so does his expected
bid. Hence, the auctioneer might prefer a contest with individually weaker but more homogeneous
contestants and thus might want to exclude the bidder with the highest valuation in absolute terms,
v1, from the auction. In the remainder we will refer to the bidder with valuation v1 as the high
type or in short vH. The bidders with valuations v2 and v3 are referred to as medium type (vM)
and low type (vL), respectively.
2.2 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of two treatments which di⁄er with respect to the composition of valuations
in the auctions as described below. Each of the treatments includes two parts.
In the ￿rst part we elicit the risk preferences of our subjects by using a binary lottery
procedure (see e.g. Holt and Laury (2002)). The procedure includes 15 decisions between a binary
5lottery and a safe option. The binary lottery is always the same, paying e4 or nothing with a
50 percent chance each, while the safe option increases from e0.25 to e3.75 in steps of 25 cents.5
Thus, the higher the ￿xed amount at which a subject switches from the lottery to the guaranteed
payment, the less risk-averse this person is. A person who is risk-neutral should prefer the lottery
up to an amount of e1.75 and choose the safe option at e2 and thereafter.
In the second part subjects play the all-pay auction in groups of three. For each bidding
group, the valuations are drawn randomly in advance, such that vH > vM > vL, i.e. the bidders
di⁄er with respect to their valuations. Two valuations are drawn from the discrete uniform dis-
tribution over the interval [11;20]. The third valuation is drawn from a discrete distribution over
the interval [15;55], that is constructed such that the exclusion of the strongest bidder is bene￿cial
with probability p = 0:5, given that the two other valuations are drawn from the discrete uniform
distribution over the interval [11;20]. We constructed our two treatments from these valuations. In
treatment (EXP) the valuations were su¢ ciently heterogenous such that the exclusion of the high
type is always expected to pay o⁄ for the contest designer. In treatment (EXW) the composition
of groups is more homogenous and excluding the high type should be worse than letting all bidders
participate in the auction. As we want to investigate the exclusion principle by Baye, Kovenock,
and de Vries (1993), the bidder with valuation vH is excluded from the auction with p = 0:5. The
aim is then to compare in each treatment the revenue of an auction with two homogeneous bidders
with valuation vM and vL to the revenue of an auction with all three bidders with vH > vM > vL.
Note that when the bidder with the highest valuation vH is excluded from the auction, the bidder
with the originally second-highest valuation vM has the highest valuation among the participating
bidders who both submit a positive bid in expectation.
As the two treatments di⁄er only with respect to the composition of valuations, the course
of action is identical. In both treatments the all-pay auction was repeated 50 times, including one
trial period. At the beginning of each round, the subjects in each bidding group were randomly
assigned a valuation. Thus, subjects experienced to be the high-, medium- and low-type bidder
over time. The valuations in the bidding group were made common knowledge, then the computer
decided with probability p = 0:5 whether the high type was participating in a particular round.
Whether or not this was the case was also commonly known. Hence, before submitting their bids,
the subjects were aware of all valuations in their group and whether the auction was run among
two or three bidders. At the end of each round they learned of their earnings and the winning bid.
5We adapted this particular setting from Domen and Falk (2006).
6Bidders who were excluded from participation were also informed about the winning bid, but did
not earn anything in the round.
We employed a random matching protocol in groups of six in each round, i.e. we randomly
assigned six subjects to two groups of three. Therefore, a matching group of six subjects is one
independent observation. At the end of the second part of the experiment we publicly and randomly
drew eight out of the 50 rounds to determine subjects￿earnings. The sum of points in these eight
periods were exchanged at a rate of 10 points = 1 Euro. Additionally, the participants received an
initial endowment of e10 to cover potential losses.
We conducted four sessions with 18 participants each (two sessions for EXP and two sessions
for EXW) in the computer lab at Technische Universit￿t Berlin using the software tool kit z-
Tree, developed by Fischbacher (2007). We recruited subjects using the recruiting tool ORSEE,
developed by Greiner (2004). Upon entering the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to their
computer terminals. At ￿rst, the instructions for the lottery choice procedure were displayed on
their computer screen. At that point subjects were not aware of the second task. After completing
the lottery choice task, subjects received written instructions for the all-pay auction, including a
test to con￿rm understanding. We only proceeded with the second part after all subjects had
answered all the questions correctly. In total 72 students (40 males and 32 females) from various
disciplines participated in the eight sessions. Sessions lasted about two hours and subjects￿average
earnings were about e20.
3 Results
In this section we will present our main ￿ndings. First, we look at some aggregate results. Second,
we analyze the behavior with respect to exclusion and the di⁄erent individual valuations. In the
third subsection we look at the distribution of bids of the di⁄erent types.
3.1 Aggregate results and group level behavior
We begin our analysis by looking at the variables of greatest interest to the contest designer: the
bids of the contestants and the revenue of the contest. Table 1 presents the summary statistics
of the behavior in the two treatments and the respective theoretical predictions. "NoExcl." refers
to rounds in which all three bidders participated in the contest, whereas "Excl." describes the
statistics of those rounds, when the high type was excluded from participation.
7EXP EXW
NoExcl. Excl. NoExcl. Excl.
ave. sum of bids 18.75 14.02 22.54 13.63
(11.83) (8.72) (14.36) (8.27)
ave. predicted sum of bid 11.72 14.27 14.56 11.43
(2.39) ( 2.63) (2.22) (2.24)
average bid 6.25 7.01 7.51 6.81
(8.69) (6.42) (10.39) (6.34)
average predicted bid 3.90 7.13 4.85 5.71
(3.40) (1.36) (3.86) (1.41)
minimum bid 0 0 0 0
maximum bid 100 40 100 40
N 900 600 864 624
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Bids in EXP and EXW
Comparing the average sum of bids in the no-exclusion condition with the average sum of
bids in the exclusion condition reveals that on average exclusion does not pay o⁄with regard to the
auctioneer￿ s revenue, even if it theoretically should in treatment EXP. However, the average bid
increases in EXP when exclusion takes place, which is a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition for
exclusion to be pro￿table. Still, the drop in the sum of bids is signi￿cantly greater in EXW than
in EXP (see regression below), such that it can be concluded that excluding the strongest bidder
is less harmful if bidders have rather heterogeneous valuations as in EXP.
The reason for exclusion not being pro￿table could be the heavy overbidding which is
observed when three bidders are participating in the auction. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test between
the observed and the predicted sum of bids under the conservative assumption that the average
bid averaged over all periods within a matching group is one independent observation, yields a
signi￿cant di⁄erence at a 5-percent level in both treatments (EXP and EXW: z = 2:201;p <
0:027;n = 6). This behavioral pattern of overexertion is analogous to the results of previous
studies on all-pay auctions in related di⁄erent environments, e.g. Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006),
Barut, Kovenock, and Noussair (2002) or Noussair and Silver (2006). If the high type is excluded,
8the di⁄erence between observed and predicted bids is not signi￿cant. The di⁄erence in the sum of
bids between EXP and EXW is neither signi￿cant in the exclusion nor the no-exclusion condition.6
To get a deeper insight into the reasons for exclusion not being pro￿table, we run a regression
both for the sum of all bids and the sum of only the medium and low types￿bids as dependent
variables. In doing this we get a notion of whether it is the high type or rather the medium and
low types that drive this ￿nding. As explanatory variables we include a treatment dummy equal
to one when the treatment is EXW, a dummy variable exclusion, that is equal to one when the
high type was excluded from the auction in a particular round, and an interaction term of the
two dummies. The baseline treatment is EXP without exclusion. In this treatment exclusion is
predicted to pay o⁄. For both regressions we apply the random-e⁄ects panel method to control
for the repeated decisions of an individual in a matching group, taking each matching group as a
cluster. The results are displayed in table 2.
dependent variable
sum of bids
sum of bids of
medium and low type
EXW (D) 3.713￿￿ (1.97) 1.456 (1.40)
exclusion (D) -5.029￿￿￿ (0.86) 8.891￿￿￿ (0.75)
EXW*ex -4.030￿￿￿ (1.23) -1.80￿ (1.07)





Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered for matching groups),
*,**,*** Signi￿cant at 10-, 5-, 1-percent level.
Table 2: Regression: Sum of Bids
It can be inferred from the regression given that all three bidders participate in the auction
that the revenue of the auction is signi￿cantly higher when valuations are more homogeneous (in
EXW). This holds, though the valuation of the highest bidders is on average greater in EXP due
6At least in the no-exclusion condition this is probably due to the small number of observations (Mann-Whitney
test in the no-exclusion condition z = ￿1:44;p < 0:149;n = 12).
9to the construction of the treatments. This observation is in line with the theory. However, the
revenue drops signi￿cantly in EXP when the strongest bidder is excluded. Hence, exclusion is
not pro￿table in this setup. This drop is even bigger in the EXW treatment. Thus, exclusion is
worse when valuations are more homogeneous as in EXW compared to the more heterogeneous
composition in EXP.
Observation 1 Exclusion of the strongest bidder never pays o⁄ in terms of revenue. However,
exclusion is less detrimental if the strongest bidder is far superior.
In the presence of a very strong bidder, the sum of bids of the two weaker bidders should
be lower compared to the case when they compete with a less predominant high type as in EXW.
However, the second regression reveals no di⁄erence in the treatments with three bidders. Hence,
this prerequisite for the exclusion principle to work is not given. In line with theory, the sum of
bids of the medium and low type increases signi￿cantly if the high type is excluded. This increase
is lower in the EXW treatment, but the coe¢ cient of EXW*ex is only signi￿cant on a 10%-level.
The di⁄erences in the treatments seem to be driven only slightly by the behavior of the medium
and low type, and mainly by the high type. Thus, the exclusion principle seems to have no bite, as
the medium and low type do not compensate the auction designer for the loss in e⁄ort when the
high type is excluded. To understand how the aggregate behavior emerges, we analyze the behavior
of the di⁄erent bidders￿types in the next section.
3.2 Behavior of di⁄erent types
Our preceding analysis has shown that excluding the high type from participation does not pay
o⁄. To get a deeper insight into why this is the case, we will now turn to an analysis of the three
types of players. The following table 3 provides an overview of their average bids in the di⁄erent
treatments with respect to exclusion.
The massive overbidding by the high types is striking. In both treatments they bid almost
twice as much as predicted by theory if they participate in the auction. A Wilcoxon signed-rank
test reveals the di⁄erence to be signi￿cant at the one percent level (EXP and EXW: z = 2:882;p <
0:0039;n = 12) under the conservative assumption of one average observation per matching group.
The high types tend to forgo a substantial part of their rent in order to increase their chance of
winning. In particular, they win over 80% of the auctions in both treatments which is about 15%
more often that predicted, and earn 25% less than predicted. Consequently, excluding the high
10EXP EXW
High type Med. type Low type High type Med. type Low type
Bid w/o Exclusion 13.84 2.12 2.78 16.13 4.22 2.18
(8.13) ( 5.17) ( 6.89) (7.67) ( 10.59) ( 6.29)
Predicted Bid w/o Exclusion 7.91 3.80 0.00 8.98 5.58 0.00
(1.19) (1.42) (0.00) (0.84) (1.70) (0.00)
Bid with Exclusion - 8.50 5.52 - 9.68 3.94
(6.04) (6.46) (5.55) (5.77)
Predicted Bid with Exclusion - 7.43 6.84 - 6.54 4.88
(1.26) (1.39) (0.96) (1.30)
minimum bid 0 0 0 0 0 0
maximum bid 100 40 55 100 100 40
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 3: Summary Statistics according to bidders￿types
type is detrimental to the auction￿ s revenue. In cases when the high type is excluded, it is the
medium type who bids more than predicted. Again, this di⁄erence is signi￿cant in both treatments
(in EXP at the 10%￿level with z = 1:922;p < 0:054;n = 12, and in EXW at the 1%￿level with
z = 2:822;p < 0:0039;n = 12). Hence, also the medium types bid too aggressively when they are
the bidder with the highest valuation. However, with respect to the magnitude their overbidding
is not as strong as that of the high types.
Observation 2 Independent of the composition of valuations, the respective strongest bidder in an
auction overbids.
As in our setup the subjects not only know their own valuation, but also the valuations of
the two other group members, we can analyze how their bids in the two treatments are in￿ uenced
by the composition of the valuations within their groups. Remember, only two bidders should be
active in the auction as there is just one prize. The expected bid of the stronger bidder should
not depend on her own but only on her opponent￿ s valuation, i.e. the bid of the high type should
increase in vM and the bid of the medium type should increase in vL if the high type is excluded
and she herself is the stronger bidder. The expected bid of the weaker bidder should increase in
11his own and decrease in his opponent￿ s valuation, i.e. the medium type￿ s bid should increase in
vM and decrease in vH and the low type￿ s bid should increase in vL and decrease in vM if the high
type is excluded. This implies that independently of whether or not the high type is excluded, the
valuations have an unambiguous e⁄ect on the expected bids from the theoretical point of view.
In order to investigate whether the di⁄erent types react to the valuations as predicted,
we run a random e⁄ects panel regression with the bids of the respective bidders as dependent
variables, taking a matching group as a cluster. As explanatory variables we include (in addition
the valuations and the above introduced dummy variables) a lagged variable win_type equal to
one when the subject won the auction the last time she was in exactly the same situation. For
example, this dummy is one when in a particular round a subject is the medium type and the high
type is excluded and she won the prize the last time she was in exactly this situation. In doing this,
we get a hint whether subjects adjust their behavior according to their type. Recall that valuations
and thus types are allocated randomly to the subjects.
In contrast to the literature on standard auctions, less is known as to how risk-averse peo-
ple behave in all-pay auctions, in particular under complete information. In ￿rst-price auctions
risk-averse bidders bid more aggressively than risk-neutral bidders, because they are afraid of not
winning the prize. Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2006) theoretically show that this result concerning
risk aversion partly carries over to an all-pay auction with independent private values under incom-
plete information. They show that risk-averse contestants with low valuations bid less aggressively
and contestants with high valuations bid more aggressively compared to risk-neutral contestants.
Whereas in their framework bidders play pure strategies, in a complete information setup as ours
the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. A common interpretation of mixed strategies is that they
re￿ ect the uncertainty about others￿choice of a pure strategy (Harsanyi (1973)). According to
Harsanyi￿ s puri￿cation theorem the mixed strategy equilibria in our game can be treated as a lim-
iting case of a game with incomplete information. Therefore, the results of Fibich, Gavious, and
Sela (2006) might also hold in our setup. The investigate this, we include a dummy variable for risk
aversion which is one when a subject displayed some degree of risk aversion in the above explained
lottery choice procedure and zero otherwise7, as well as an interaction term of the risk aversion and
the exclusion dummy. When subjects displayed unsystematic behavior by switching several times
between the lottery and the ￿xed payment, they were excluded from the regression. This was the
7All subjects who prefer the safe choice over the lottery at the amount of e2 and thereafter, are not categorized
as risk averse, whereas all others with a switching point at e1.75 or earlier are.
12case for 18 out of 72 subjects.
dependent variable:
Bid of High Bid of Med Bid of Min
vH 0:144￿￿￿ (0:039) 0:015 (0:025) ￿0:009 (0:022)
vM 0:747￿￿￿ (0:263) 0:307￿ (0:160) 0:020 (0:141)
vL ￿0:220 (0:251) ￿0:183 (0:150) 0:106 (0:131)
EXW(D) 0:662 (2:170) 0:384 (0:836) 0:572 (0:740)
exclusion(D) ￿ 5:219￿￿￿ (0:757) 2:100￿￿￿ (0:582)
EXW ￿ exclusion(D) ￿ ￿0:496 (0:843) ￿0:958 (0:736)
(win_type)t￿1 (D) 1:300 (0:889) 10:865￿￿￿ (1:076) 7:511￿￿￿ (1:050)
(win_type)t￿1 ￿ ex(D) ￿ ￿8:205￿￿￿ (1:259) ￿2:874￿￿ (1:211)
risk aversion(D) 1:733￿ (0:951) ￿1:810￿￿￿ (0:704) ￿1:343￿￿ (0:607)
ex ￿ risk aversion(D) 1:438 (0:973) ￿0:274 (0:865)
Constant ￿1:764 (3:185) ￿1:716 (1:773) ￿0:293 (1:597)
R2 0:12 0:31 0:18
￿2 41:38 370:57 175:50
N 385 803 797
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered for matching groups),
*,**,*** Signi￿cant at 10-, 5-, 1-percent level.
Table 4: Regressions according to bidders￿types
As can be inferred from table 4, the valuations do not in￿ uence the bids as predicted. The
bids of the medium and the low type seem to be very little in￿ uenced by the valuations. In fact,
on a 10%-level, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the joint impact of the valuations is zero. If
at all, the medium type increases her bid in her own valuation, which is in line with the theory.
The high type￿ s bids seem to depend too much on the valuations. In line with theory, they are
positively in￿ uenced by the medium valuation. However, her own valuation also has a signi￿cant
positive impact, though it should not have any.
Observation 3 For the medium and the low type, the valuations hardly play a role in determining
their bids, whereas the high type￿ s bid depends both on her own and the medium valuation.
13As expected, the medium and low type signi￿cantly increase their bids when the high type
is excluded. But as we have seen above, this increase cannot make up for the loss due to the
exclusion of the high type. As the coe¢ cient of win_typet￿1 is signi￿cant for the medium and low
type, subjects seem well to be aware of their position within their bidding group and the outcome
of their bidding strategies. In fact, the experience of the preceding round heavily increases the
bids of the medium and low type when the high type is part of the auction. The increase is still
signi￿cant but smaller in its magnitude when the high type is excluded, as the hypothesis that
win_typet￿1 +win_typet￿1 ￿ex(D) = 0 can safely be rejected (Wald test statistic for the medium
type: ￿2
(1) = 16:86;p < 0:001, and for the low type: ￿2
(1) = 58:33;p < 0:001). Thus, medium-
and low-type subjects, who were successful in winning the auction, bid more aggressively in the
following round in which the high type takes part. One has to take into account that the medium-
and low-type bidders win the auction rarely (i.e. win_type was only rarely equal to one). But if it
happens, they seem to enjoy winning such that they want to replicate this outcome by substantially
increasing their bids.
The in￿ uence of the risk-aversion dummy di⁄ers according to the subject￿ s type. For the
high type, risk aversion leads to substantially higher bids and vice versa for the other types in the
no-exclusion condition. The hypothesis that ra + ex ￿ ra = 0 cannot be rejected for the medium
type. So, unlike the high type, a risk-averse medium type does not bid more aggressively when he
is the stronger bidder, but at least he does not lower his bid.8 Hence, in large part our ￿ndings
match the predictions of Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2006).
Observation 4 Risk aversion leads to (weakly) higher bids of the stronger bidder and to lower bids
of the weaker bidder.
3.3 Distribution of bids
3.3.1 Bids of the strongest bidders in a round
In this section we only look at the behavior of the respective strongest bidder in a group, which is
particularly revealing. This bidder can be either of the high type, or of the medium type in case the
high type has been excluded. According to theory, the strongest bidders￿bid should be uniformly
8Analyzing the dependent variables without controlling for risk attitudes and thus including all subjects into the
regression does not qualitatively change the results, except that the coe¢ cient of vM for the medium type becomes
insigni￿cant.
14distributed over the interval [0;v2], where v2 denotes the valuation of the bidder with the respective
second-highest valuation. Over the rounds, there should not be any mass points or bids above v2,
or at least only occasionally. But we observe a behavior completely distinct from this prediction,
summarized in the following table 5.
Percentage of bids with Total
bid = 0 0 < bid < v2 bid = v2 bid > v2 N
High type in the No-Exclusion condition 0.5% 35.5% 17% 47% 588
Medium type in the Exclusion condition 3.4% 56% 16.2% 24.5% 612
Table 5: Bidding Behavior of the respective high types
When the high type took part in the auction, she chose a bid at least as high as the valuation
of the medium type in 64% of the cases. If the high type was excluded, the medium type adopted
a similar strategy, in 40% of the cases playing the "safe" strategy. This is certainly not in line with
the theory which predicts no mass point at v2. In fact, 35% of the bids were even strictly higher
than v2 , while this should never occur according to theory. Also, this behavior hardly changes over
time, as can be inferred from Figure 1. The picture shows histograms of the bids of the high types
relative to the second-highest valuation in the top panel, and the same for the medium type under
the exclusion condition in the bottom panel. That is, the value on the x-axis equals (is higher
than) one if a bidders￿bid matches (exceeds) the second-highest valuation. These relative bids
are summarized over the ￿rst and second half of the experiment (left and right panel) in order to
illustrate the change over time.
As subjects are supposed to play mixed strategies, it is revealing to look at the cumulative
distributions of the bids. The theoretical cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the high type￿ s
bid xH depends on the medium valuation vM as xH is uniformly distributed over the interval [0;vM].
As vM varies in our experimental design, we cannot directly draw the cumulative distribution
function of the bids jointly for all rounds. However, we can transform the distribution such that
the support is independent of vM: A high type should never bid more than the medium￿ s type
valuation. The maximum ratio of her bid relative to vM is thus one. All bids lower than vM are
chosen with equal probability. This implies that the high type￿ s bid relative to the medium valuation
is uniformly distributed over the unit interval: (xH=vM) ￿ U[0;1]. Hence, we can compare the
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Figure 1: Fraction of the strongest bidders￿bids relative to the second highest valuation
prediction. The same argument holds when the medium type is the strongest bidder. The following
Figure 2 shows on the left-hand the cumulative distribution of the relative bids for the high type and
on the right-hand for the medium type when the high type was excluded, as well as the respective
predicted cdfs.
The theoretical prediction describes behavior far from adequately. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test validates that both observed distributions are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from a uniform distribution
(p￿values < 0:001). Both observed distributions have a mass point where the respective bid equals
the second-highest valuation. In addition, the bids often exceed the second-highest valuations, i.e.
the bids are beyond the theoretical support. Also, the observed distributions are di⁄erent from
each other on a one-percent signi￿cance level (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p ￿ value < 0:001). The
distribution of the high type￿ s bids ￿rst-order stochastically dominates the one of the medium type￿ s
bids, i.e. the likelihood that a bidder chooses a bid smaller than a certain value is lower for the
high type.
Given the (anticipated) behavior of their opponents, many of the respective strongest types
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Figure 2: Cumulated relative bids of the strongest bidder
at least the valuation of their strongest opponent. By playing this "safe" strategy, they can be
(almost) sure to win the auction and thereby generate a positive pro￿t. Apparently, the chance
of making a higher pro￿t accompanied by the risk of losing the auction and thus their bid, seems
not as attractive to many of the strongest bidders. The high types are even more prone to play
this "safe" winning strategy than the medium types. Hence, the behavior of the subjects seems to
di⁄er depending on whether they are the high or the medium type, though they are the strongest
bidders in both cases.
To show whether the behavior of the high and the medium type with respect to the safe
strategy is signi￿cantly di⁄erent, we run a panel probit regression, with the dummy "safe" as
the dependent variable. This variable equals one if the subject with the highest valuation of the
participating bidders in this round chooses a bid, that is at least as high as the respective second-
highest valuation, i.e. for the high type safe equals one, if xH ￿ vM, and for the medium type safe
is one if xM ￿ vL and the high type is excluded. Recall that we are only interested in the behavior
of the respective strongest bidders in a group. The independent variable high is equal to one, if the
subject is the high type and zero if he is the medium type. As before, we take the matching groups
as a cluster. Results are shown in the left panel of table 6. The regression con￿rms the impression
in that a strongest bidder of the high type is signi￿cantly more likely to choose the safe strategy
than a strongest bidder of the medium type.
The di⁄erence in behavior between the two types could be due to the di⁄erences in the
situations the strongest bidders are confronted with. First, most of the time the high types compete
17against comparatively weaker opponents than the medium types do. Hence, the more frequent
choice of the safe strategy by the high types could be due to the fact that the distance between
their own valuation and the valuation of the second-strongest bidder is larger than for the medium
types. Second, the high types always face two opponents, whereas the medium type has just one,
given she is the strongest bidder. In order to judge which of these di⁄erences better explains the
di⁄erence in behavior, we run second a panel probit regression, with the same dependent variable.
As independent variables we include again a dummy variable for high, which equals one if the
subject is the high type and zero otherwise. This dummy is now supposed to capture the e⁄ect
of facing two opponents versus one as we introduce a second explanatory variable, distance, that
should capture the distance in valuations. This distance variable is (vH ￿ vM) for the high types
and (vM ￿ vL) for the medium types. To capture the e⁄ect of an increasing distance in valuations
we also include the square of distance. In addition, we run the regression only for the subsample of
observations where vH ￿vM ￿ 9, as nine is the maximum amount the medium types￿valuation can
be larger than the low types￿one and hence for all distances larger than nine high always equals
one. The results are shown in the medium column of table 6.
Dependent Variable: safe
high 0.596￿￿￿ (0.114) 0.119 (0.143) -
distance - 0.321￿￿￿ (0.105) 0.052￿￿ (0.022)
distance2 - -0.026￿￿ (0.010) -0.0006 (0.0004)
constant -0.239￿ (0.131) -0.854￿￿￿ (0.197) -0.271 (0.248)
Pseudo R2 0.040 0.040 0.038
N 1200 760 588
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered for matching groups),
*,**,*** Signi￿cant at 10-, 5-, 1-percent level.
Table 6: Choice of the safe strategy
As the coe¢ cient for high becomes insigni￿cant, when the distance variables are included,
it seems that it is the degree of her superiority that drives a bidder to choose the safe bidding
strategy rather than the number of (weaker) opponents. The stronger a bidder is compared to her
keenest competitor, the more likely she is to bid at least as much as the other￿ s valuation. This
increase in likelihood attenuates as the distance in valuations becomes larger, as the coe¢ cient of
18distance2 is signi￿cantly negative.
The last column of table 6 displays the probit regression for the high types only, for the full
range of valuations. On a 5%-signi￿cance level distance has a positive impact on the probability of
playing safe.
Observation 5 The strongest bidders often submit bids that ensure winning the auction, i.e. bids
that are at least as high as the valuation of the next strongest bidder. The probability of choosing
such a safe strategy increases as the superiority with respect to the second-strongest bidder increases.
The observed behavior of the strongest bidders could be explained by regret aversion of





(v1 ￿ x1) if bidder 1 wins
￿x1 ￿ ￿ (v1 ￿ v2) if bidder 1 loses
;
where ￿ ￿ 0. Loser regret in all-pay auctions with complete information and heterogeneous players
has not yet been analyzed. In symmetric auctions it is assumed that a bidders￿regret depends on
the di⁄erence between her valuation and the bid she should have placed in order to win the auction
(see e.g. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007), or Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (2010)). Unlike in our
setting, in symmetric auctions there is no possibility for the bidders to generate a secure positive
payo⁄; the amount of regret the bidder experiences in the case of a loss depends on the winning
bid of their opponent.
In our setup it is natural to assume a slightly di⁄erent notion of regret. A subject who is
a high type can decide to "gamble" by bidding less than vM and thus generating a higher pro￿t
should she win. If she then loses the auction, she might well regret her decision to gamble instead
of going for the safe prospect. Thus, regret is a function of the di⁄erence between the bidder￿ s
own valuation and the valuation of the opponent (not the winning bid). It captures the idea that
the strongest bidder decides upfront whether to gamble or not, and the regret she feels about her
decision afterwards when she chose to gamble and lost. This notion does not point out the regret
a bidder might feel because he chose too low a bid when playing a mixed strategy but because he
chose a mixed strategy at all. Hence, this variant of regret gives a lower bound of the regret feeling
as compared to the mentioned case of symmetric auctions. By the design of our experiment, winner
regret is excluded as the subjects do not learn the losing bids.
Given that the respective second-strongest bidders play the equilibrium strategy that makes
bidders without regret indi⁄erent with regard to their bids, all bidders who have feelings of regret,
19￿ > 0, will prefer to bid the valuation of their opponent v2. This follows directly from the fact that
in the standard mixed equilibrium the high type is indi⁄erent between all his actions as all of them
give him an expected payo⁄ of (v1 ￿ v2), whereas with regret all actions except x1 = v2 lead to an
expected payo⁄lower than (v1 ￿ v2) as they entail the chance of losing and therefore the additional
disutility from regret. Certainly, the bidder with the second-highest valuation could anticipate
the preferences of the strongest bidder and deviate from the standard equilibrium strategy by
randomizing in a way such that the strongest bidder is indi⁄erent between her bids. However, by
looking at the data, this is not what the inferior bidders do, as we will demonstrate in section
3.3.2. Instead their behavior seems close to the theoretical prediction with risk aversion. Also,
when the aversion to regret of a high type is strong enough, she will always bid the valuation of
the second-strongest bidder, as long as there is a small probability that she will lose the auction by
bidding less than vM: The same holds for the medium types when the high type is excluded.
It is plausible that regret aversion only matters if the amount that is to be regretted in case
of a loss is su¢ ciently large.9 Accepting this, the di⁄erence in behavior regarding the safe strategy
between the high and the medium type can be explained. For example, if ￿ is only positive, if
(v1 ￿ v2) > 1, we should observe more "safe" behavior for the high types because their valuation
tends to be far greater than their opponent￿ s, whereas the medium type is often only a little superior
to the other bidder. In fact, 97% of the time the high types are confronted with a second-strongest
player whose valuation is lower than their own by more than one. In contrast, a medium player
faces such a weak opponent only 30% of the time. Also, it is unlikely that all subjects exhibit regret
aversion. Given that the critical value above which a regret averse player chooses the safe option
is one, there needs to be 66% regret averse players in order to explain the observed safe play of
64% for the high types. For the medium types there should be 59% regret averse players to explain
the 40% safe choices. Given that it is not exactly the same subjects who are in the position of the
strongest bidder as high and medium type, the percentage of regret-averse players (66% vs. 59%)
seems reasonably close to consistently explain the behavior.
In some all-pay auction experiments, loss aversion serves as an explanation for observed
overbidding behavior (M￿ller and Schotter (2010); Ernst and Th￿ni (2009)). With loss aversion,
utility in case of a loss would be u1(v1;x1) = (￿x1 ￿ ￿x1) ;￿ > 0. The disutility from losing is
independent of the valuations what implies that loss aversion cannot fully explain our results. Like
9This assumption is supported by the signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect of distance on the likelihood of the safe stragey
to be chosen as shown in the regression results in table 6.
20a regret averse bidder, a loss averse bidder would prefer the safe small prospect over the risk of
making a loss. Hence, loss averse bidders would also choose the safe strategy given that a player
with standard preferences is indi⁄erent. But the behavior of high and medium types as strongest
bidders should not di⁄er as the losses are the same for both types whereas the regret bidders
possibly feel is greater for the high type.
3.3.2 Behavior of the second-strongest bidders in a round
In this section, we look at the behavior of the second-strongest bidder, i.e. the medium type
when the high type took part in the auction or the low type when the high type was excluded.
As the theoretical distribution of the bids of the second-strongest bidders depends on both her
own and the strongest bidder￿ s valuation, we have to compare the observed distribution with an
average cumulative distribution function. Recall that the second-strongest bidder bids zero with
probability (1 ￿ v2=v1) and submits a positive bid with probability (v2=v1). Conditional on her
active participation, her bid is uniformly distributed over the interval [0;v2_ ]. As in the previous
section, we normalize the support of the distribution function to [0;1] by looking at the distribution
of the bids relative to v2, i.e. the own valuation of the second-strongest bidder. We compare the
observed cumulative distribution of these relative bids with the theoretical prediction based on the
average probability of a bidder submitting a positive bid, given the valuations v2 and v1. This
average entry probability equals 0.544 when the medium type is the second-strongest bidder and
0.823 when the low type is the second-strongest bidder. Again the observed distribution di⁄ers
substantially from the theoretical prediction. Both the medium and the low type submit too many
zero bids, i.e. they drop out of the competition. But given that they have entered the auction,
a uniform distribution of bids seems to be quite a good approximation. Given that the inferior
bidders understand that there are regret-averse opponents who almost always bid them out, their
best reply to this strategy is to bid zero. This could explain the larger portion of zero bidding
compared to the theoretical prediction.
Applying the concept of regret aversion the way we de￿ned it for the strongest bidders to
the second-strongest bidders should not alter their strategies as there is no safe gain and thus no
regret. But risk aversion might bias the bids downwards as seen in table 4. Also, loss aversion
could be part of the explanation as it leads to more zero bidding.
Surprisingly, the second-strongest bidder frequently submits a bid higher than her own
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Figure 3: Cumulated relative bids of the weaker bidder
won there is a loss in terms of income. However, this behavior has also been observed in other
experiments and could be explained for example by emotions (see Kr￿kel (2008)). The strong
increase in bids of the medium and low type after they won the auction could be an indicator of
emotions (see table 4). In the model of the all-pay auction the joy of winning increases the support
of the second-strongest bidder￿ s bid function and consequently also the support of the high type￿ s
bid function. Hence, emotions by some bidders can also explain those bids of the high types that
are above v2.
4 Conclusion
Superstars can have a major impact on the attractiveness of contests, but at the same time their
presence can be detrimental for their competitors￿willingness to exert e⁄ort. In this paper, we
experimentally investigate the e⁄ect of excluding superstars from the contest and thereby creating
a more homogenous participant pool. We ￿nd that in our setting excluding the strongest bidder is
never bene￿cial for the contest designer. The main reason for this result is the massive overbidding
of superstars when they participate in the all-pay auction. They prefer to give up a substantial
part of their rent in order to avoid losing the auction. Without a superstar, a more homogeneous
but individually weaker group of bidders cannot make up for this.
We very frequently observe that the strongest contestants, both with and without exclusion,
choose pure strategies instead of mixed strategies as theory would predict. In fact, they make sure of
winning the auction by bidding at least the valuation of their most powerful competitor. Moreover,
22the tendency of choosing a "winning-for-sure" strategy increases if the payo⁄ that can be secured
by this strategy is higher. We explain this behavior with regret aversion. Choosing a strategy
that entails the possibility of losing the auction may create feelings of regret because the strongest
contestant could have ensured that she wins the auction by bidding the valuation of the strongest
competitor, which guarantees a positive payo⁄.
The substantial overbidding of superstars also leads to many dropouts of the weaker con-
testants. While the dropout behavior could provide an argument for designing a homogenous
contest without a superstar, we do not ￿nd support for this in terms of revenue. The increased
e⁄ort of the weaker contestants in the absence of the strongest contestant cannot compensate for
the superstars￿e⁄ort. The substantial dropout can just be explained by loss aversion. Regression
results also indicate that risk aversion leads to the weaker contestants making lower bids.
We presented evidence that a behavioral bias, such as regret, can explain overbidding. This
result might also indicate the subjects are reluctant to play mixed strategies because they might
regret their decision afterwards. This opens interesting questions for future research.
Appendix
In the following, we present you the translated instructions that were given to the subjects to explain
the all-pay auction. The subjects also had to answer some questions to con￿rm understanding.
These questions are also given below. The instructions for the lottery choice procedure are available
on request.
Instructions for the all-pay auction
General
The second part of the experiment consists of 50 periods in each of which you have to make a
decision. Through your decision you can earn points. These points constitute your income which
is exchanged to Euro according to the conversion rate stated below. Your earnings from the ￿rst
part of the experiment and from this part will be paid in cash to you at the end of the session.
In each of the 50 periods you are randomly matched with two other participants to form a
group. From now on we label these two participants as group members. You and the other group
members do not learn the identity of each other at any point of time. In the following we explain
the di⁄erent decisions you have to make and the procedure of the experiment.
23Decision in one period
In each period the computer randomly generates and assigns a number to you and the other group
members. One of these number will be drawn from the set f15;16;::::;55g and the other two
numbers from the set f11;12;:::::;20g. In the beginning of each period you learn your number and
the two numbers of the other group members. In the remainder, we will refer to these numbers as
"random numbers".
Before you make your decision, the computer randomly decides with a probability of 50%
whether the group member with the highest random number is excluded from this period. This
means that on average in 5 out of 10 cases the group member with the highest random number
actively participates in that period. Also, in 5 out of 10 cases the group member with the highest
random number is excluded and will not receive an income in that period. If it is not you who has
the highest random number in a period you de￿nitely participate. You will learn in each period,
whether the group member with the highest random number is being excluded or not.
Every participating group member has to choose an arbitrary number. The number can
have up to three decimal and has to be non-negative (zero is possible). All group member choose
their number simultaneously. We denote this number ￿decision number￿ .
Calculation of your income in one period
Your income depends on your decision number, as well as the decision number of the other group
members and your random number.
After the decisions of all group members were made, the computer compares and ranks the
three decision numbers.
￿ If your decision number is the highest number, you earn your random number minus your
decision number in this period.
period income = random number ￿decision number
￿ If your decision number is not the highest number, you earn zero minus your decision number
in this period.
period income = 0 ￿decision number
In case of a tie, the highest number is determined randomly.
24Please note: The decision number you have chosen will be deducted from your period income
independent from the rank of your decision number, i.e. your income will in any case be reduced
by your decision number.
If you choose a high decision number, you increase the probability that your decision number
is the highest. But a high decision number also reduces your income, since a higher number is
deducted from your random number. If your decision number is not the highest, your income is
also reduced by your decision number. At the end of a period you learn your income in this period.
If your decision number was not the highest, you additionally learn the highest decision number.
If your decision number was the highest number you only learn your income in this period.
Example for calculation of the income in one period
Consider the following situation:
Your random number is 28 and you learn the random of the other group members. The
computer decides that all group members participate in this period. You choose 16 as your decision
number.
a) In case you have the highest decision number, you earn your ￿ random number￿ minus your
decision number, i.e. your income in this period is 28 ￿16 = 12
b) In case your decision number is not the highest decision number, you earn zero minus your
decision number, i.e. your income in this period is 0 ￿16 = -16
Please note, that your income depends on your random number, your decision number and
the decision numbers of the other two group members.
Consider now the following situation:
Your ￿ random number￿ is 28 and you learn the random of the other group members. You
￿nd out that your decision number is not the highest number in the group. Hence you participate in
any case in this period. The computer decides, that the group members with the highest ￿ random
number￿ is excluded in this period. You choose 16 as your decision number.
a) In case you have the highest decision number, you earn your ￿ random number￿ minus your
decision number, i.e. your income in this period is 28 ￿16 = 12
25b) In case your decision number is not the highest decision number, you earn zero minus your
decision number, i.e. your income in this period is 0 ￿16 = -16
Please note, that your income depends on your random number, your decision number and
the decision numbers of the other two group members.
Consider now the following situation:
Your ￿ random number￿ is 28 and you learn the random of the other group members. You
￿nd out that your decision number is the highest number in the group. The computer decides, that
the group member with the highest random number is excluded in this period. This means for you
that this period is ￿nished for you and that you do not get an income in this period.
After the ￿rst period, we repeat this procedure in period 2, period 3, through period 50.
In each of the 50 periods you will be randomly matched with two other participants. You are
assigned a random number and learn the random numbers of the other two group members. Then
the computer decides whether the group member with the highest random number participates
in this period. All participating group members simultaneously choose their decision number and
learn their income at the end of the period.
Calculation of the total income of the second part of the experiment
In the beginning you receive a lump-sum payment of 100 points. At the end of the experiment the
computer randomly draws 10 periods which determine your income. The points you earned in this
period are then added up.
Your total income = 100 + sum of points in 10 randomly drawn periods
Your total income will be converted into to Euro at a rate of ten points for one Euro.
Trial period
Before we begin, you participate in a trial period that is not relevant for your earnings.
Quiz for the all-pay auction
Please answer the following questions and mark of ￿ll in the correct answers.
261. Suppose your random number is 19 and your decision number is 12. Your decision number is





2. Suppose your random number is 15 and your decision number is 6. Your decision number is





3. Suppose your random number is 19 and your decision number is 12. All three group members
participate in this period.
(a) If your decision number is the highest in your group, you get ______ points minus
______ points. Your income in points in this period is _________.
(b) If your decision number is the second highest in your group, you get ______ points
minus ______ points. Your income in points in this period is _________.
4. What is your income in 3a) and 3b), when the group member with the highest ￿ random
number￿ is excluded and you participate in this period?
(a) Income in situation 3a: ____________
(b) Income in situation 3b: ____________
5. In each period you will be randomly matched with two other participants.
(a) correct
(b) wrong
276. If you participate in a period, is the decision number deducted from your income independent
of the decision numbers of the other group members?
(a) Yes
(b) No
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